In my studies of airpower and, conversely, the creation of improvised antiaircraft weapons, I have often come across references to the post-WWI use of airpower by the British to maintain control over their Empire. In discussing the employment of aircraft against technologically-backward people of Africa and the Middle East the sources I read mentioned very little about the use of the RAF’s methodology, other than giving the impression that the British simply bombed tribes into submission. As it turns out there was more to it than that, and the process helped to shape many of the notable RAF airmen of the Second World War.
Newton’s book looks at the doctrinal origins of using airpower for the policing of the British Empire as well as the political decisions and financial factors which led to employing airpower against indigenous peoples on the frontiers. Following the end of the Great War the newly-independent Royal Air Force had to make itself relevant to the needs of the British Empire, needs which did not necessarily require large numbers of fighters to prevent bombing attacks or great numbers of bombers to strike at ports or supply bases. The British Empire, with territories around the world (which now included recent mandates from the German and Ottoman Empires), required a solution to the problem of primitive tribesmen who lived beyond the easy reach of British ground troops and who defied the British and their colonial governments. Airpower seemed to hold the promise of policing such populations.
The guns had hardly gone silent on the Western Front when the RAF began touting the idea of Air Control. The doctrinal basis of the idea had barely been discussed before it was tried in Somaliland, Iraq and India’s North-West Frontier. Backed up by British soldiers and colonial levies and provided intelligence and guidance by RAF Special Service Officers (SSOs) traveling in armored cars, airpower could be used to coerce natives into cooperation, if not submission.
Thanks to SSOs, who traveled among the indigenous population and communicated the desires of the Colonial administrators in the native language, the desired outcome was communicated to the leaders of various tribes. If the tribesmen understood but continued to defy the government, then the intelligence gained by the SSOs would be used by the RAF to “buzz” the domiciles of the key “targets,” or leaders, that the government wished to influence. And if all else failed, the SSO would provide warning to the group that the aircraft would be back to bomb and strafe. This resulted in what the British called a “reverse blockade,” a situation in which the locals evacuated their village and residences to travel out to the desert or nearby caves while British planes destroyed some homes, scattered livestock and burned crops. After living under extremely uncomfortable conditions the tribesmen would make the leader comply with British demands so life could go back to normal.
Indeed, much of the actions of the RAF echoes 21st Century warfare: the need to communicate directly with “targets” prior to taking action could be described as a Key Leader Engagement (KLE), the occasional use of airborne leaflets could be described as an Information Related Capability (IRC), the use of “buzzing” as a Non-Lethal Effect and the use of strafing and bombing of raiders as Lethal Effect. Anyone who has spent time discussing Targeting methodology would recognize many elements of the British Air Control scheme.
This is not to say that policing the Empire via airpower did not see its share of setbacks. First of all, the elimination of British ground troops wasn’t possible. Garrisons were needed but these were much smaller than if the British Army had sole charge of policing. Another element of Air Control saw the need to place the RAF in charge of the overall effort; in situations where the Army was in charge the effort to control indigents came down to “boots on the ground,” with the RAF doing close air support. Finally, the British were unable to use Air Control in Palestine, where conflicts happened in urban settings rather than in the wide open spaces. Riots between Jewish and Arab settlers did not provide targets for the aircraft, at least not without creating large numbers of civilian casualties and collateral damage.
Indeed, one thing that RAF and Tribal Control makes clear is that the use of kinetic action, i.e. bombing and strafing, was actually employed sparingly. The desire of the British was provided through Communication, the occasional demonstration of bombing and strafing lent Credibility to British threats and the Capability that the British maintained, not just in military hardware but also in civil and military targeting processes and permissions, brought the reality of airpower to bear.
In the case of the British, Air Control was about maintaining the peace, not fighting a war. The British rapidly learned the benefits of using kinetic assets in non-kinetic ways to achieve peace as a desired outcome.
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